The President
                  The White House
                  Washington, D.C. 20500
                Dear Mr. President,
                I am writing to request that you assert executive privilege with respect to   confidential Department of Justice (“Department”) documents that are responsive   to the subpoena issued by the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform of   the United States House of Representatives (“Committee”) on October 25, 2011.   The subpoena relates to the Committee’s investigation into Operation Fast and   Furious, a law enforcement operation conducted by the Bureau of Alcohol,   Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (“ATF”) and the United States Attorney’s   Office for the District of Arizona to stem the illegal flow of firearms from the   United States to drug cartels in Mexico (“Fast and Furious”). The Committee has   scheduled a meeting for June 20, 2012, to vote on a resolution holding me in   contempt of Congress for failing to comply with the subpoena.
                I.
                The Committee’s subpoena broadly sweeps in various groups of documents   relating to both the conduct of Operation Fast and Furious and the Department’s   response to congressional inquiries about that operation. In recognition of the   seriousness ofthe Committee’s concerns about both the inappropriate tactics used   in Fast and Furious and the inaccuracies concerning the use of those tactics in   the letter that the Department sent to Senator Grassley on February 4, 2011   (“February 4 Letter”), the Department has taken a number of significant steps in   response to the Committee’s oversight. First, the Department has instituted   various reforms to ensure that it does not repeat these law enforcement and   oversight mistakes. Second, at my request the Inspector General is investigating   the conduct of Fast and Furious. And third, to the extent consistent with   important Executive Branch confidentiality and separation of powers interests   affected by the Committee’s investigation into ongoing criminal investigations   and prosecutions, as well as applicable disclosure laws, the Department has   provided a significant amount of information in an extraordinary effort to   accommodate the Committee’s legitimate oversight interests, including testimony,   transcribed interviews, briefings and other statements by Department officials,   and all of the Department’s internal documents concerning the preparation of the   February 4 Letter.
                 The Committee has made clear that its contempt resolution will be limited to   internal Department “documents from after February 4, 2011, related to the   Department’s response to Congress.” Letter for Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney   General, from Darrell E. Issa, Chairman, Committee on Oversight and Government   Reform, U.S. House ofRepresentatives at 1-2 (June 13, 2012) (“Chairman’s   Letter”). I am asking you to assert executive privilege over these
                documents.   They were not generated in the course of the conduct of Fast and Furious.   Instead, they were created after the investigative tactics at issue in that   operation had terminated and in the course of the Department’s deliberative   process concerning how to respond to congressional and related media inquiries   into that operation. 
                In view of the significant confidentiality and separation of powers concerns   raised by the Committee’s demand for internal documents generated in response to   the Committee’s investigation, we consider the Department’s accommodations   regarding the preparation of the February 4 Letter to have been extraordinary.   Despite these accommodations, however, the Committee scheduled a vote on its   contempt resolution. At that point, the Department offered an additional   accommodation that would fully address the Committee’s remaining questions. The   Department offered to provide the Committee with a briefing, based on documents   that the Committee could retain, explaining how the Department’s understanding   of the facts of Fast and Furious evolved during the post-February 4 period, as   well as the process that led to the withdrawal of the February 4 Letter. The   Committee, however, has not accepted the Department’s offer and has instead   elected to proceed with its contempt vote.
                As set forth more fully below, I am very concerned that the compelled   production to Congress of internal Executive Branch documents generated in the   course of the deliberative process concerning its response to congressional   oversight and related media inquiries would have significant, damaging   consequences: It would inhibit the candor of such Executive Branch deliberations   in the future and significantly impair the Executive Branch’s ability to respond   independently and effectively to congressional oversight. This would raise   substantial separation of powers concerns and potentially create an imbalance in   the relationship between these two co¬ equal branches of the Government.   Consequently, as the head of the Department of Justice,
                  I respectfully   request that you assert executive privilege over the identified documents. This   letter sets forth the basis for my legal judgment that you may properly do   so.
                II.
                Executive privilege is “fundamental to the operation of Government and   inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution.” United   States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,708 (1974). It is “a necessary corollary of the   executive function vested in the President by Article II of the Constitution.”   Congressional Requests for Confidential Executive Branch Information, 13 Op.   O.L.C. 153, 154 (1989) (“Congressional Requests Opinion”) (opinion of Assistant   Attorney General William P. Barr); see U.S. Const. art. II,§ 1, cl. 1 (“The   executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of   America.”); U.S. Const. art. II, § 3 (The President shall “take Care that the   Laws be faithfully executed ….”). Indeed, executive privilege “has been asserted   by numerous Presidents from the earliest days of our Nation, and it was   explicitly recognized by the Supreme Court in United States v. Nixon.”   Congressional Requests Opinion, 13 Op. O.L.C. at 154.
                The documents at issue fit squarely within the scope of executive privilege.   In connection with prior assertions of executive privilege, two Attorneys   General have advised the President that documents of this kind are within the   scope of executive privilege. See Letter for the President from Paul D. Clement,   Solicitor General and Acting Attorney General, Re: Assertion of Executive   Privilege Concerning the Dismissal and Replacement of US. Attorneys at
                  6   (June 27, 2007) (“US. Attorneys Assertion”) (“[C]ommunications between the   Department of
                Justice and the White House concerning … possible responses to congressional   and media inquiries about the U.S. Attorney resignations … clearly fall within   the scope of executive privilege.”); Assertion of Executive Privilege Regarding   White House Counsel’s Office Documents, 20 Op. O.L.C. 2, 3 (1996) (“WHCO   Documents Assertion”) (opinion of Attorney General Janet Reno) (concluding   that”[e]xecutive privilege applies” to “analytical material or other attorney   work-product prepared by the White House Counsel’s Office in response to the   ongoing investigation by the Committee”).
                It is well established that “[t]he doctrine of executive privilege …   encompasses Executive Branch deliberative communications.” Letter for the   President from Michael B. Mukasey, Attorney General, Re: Assertion of Executive   Privilege over Communications Regarding EPA ‘s Ozone Air Quality Standards and   California’s Greenhouse Gas Waiver Request at 2 (June 19, 2008) (“EPA   Assertion”); see also, e.g, US Attorneys Assertion at 2; Assertion of Executive   Privilege with Respect To Clemency Decision, 23 Op. O.L.C. 1, 1-2 (1999)   (“Clemency Assertion”) (opinion of Attorney General Janet Reno). The threat of   compelled disclosure of confidential Executive Branch deliberative material can   discourage robust and candid deliberations, for “[h]uman experience teaches that   those who expect public dissemination of their remarks may well temper candor   with a concern for appearances and for their own interests to the detriment of   the decisionmaking process.” Nixon, 418 U.S. at 705. Thus, Presidents have   repeatedly asserted executive privilege to protect confidential Executive Branch   deliberative materials from congressional subpoena. See, e.g, EPA Assertion at   2-3; Letter for the President from Michael B. Mukasey, Attorney General, Re:   Assertion of Executive Privilege Concerning the Special Counsel ‘s Interviews of   the Vice President and Senior White House Staff at 2 (July 15, 2008) (“Special   Counsel Assertion”); Letter for the President from John Ashcroft, Attorney   General, Re: Assertion of Executive Privilege with Respect to Prosecutorial   Documents at 2 (Dec. 10, 2001) (“Prosecutorial Documents   Assertion”);
                  Clemency Assertion, 23 Op. O.L.C. at 1-4; Assertion of Executive   Privilege in Response to
                  a Congressional Subpoena, 5 Op. O.L.C. 27,29-31   (1981) (“1981 Assertion”) (opinion of
                  Attorney General William French   Smith).
                Because the documents at issue were generated in the course of the   deliberative process concerning the Department’s responses to congressional and   related media inquiries into Fast and Furious, the need to maintain their   confidentiality is heightened. Compelled disclosure of
                  such material,   regardless of whether a given document contains deliberative content, would   raise “significant separation of powers concerns,” WHCO Documents Assertion, 20   Op. O.L.C. at 3, by ‘”significantly impair[ing]“‘ the Executive Branch’s ability   to respond independently and effectively to matters under congressional review.   US. Attorneys Assertion at 6 (“the ability of the Office of the Counsel to the   President to assist the President in responding to [congressional and related   media] investigations ‘would be significantly impaired’ if a congressional   committee could review ‘confidential documents prepared in order to assist the   President and his staff in responding to an investigation by the committee   seeking the documents”‘) (quoting WHCO Documents Assertion, 20 Op. O.L.C. at 3)   (alterations omitted). See generally The Constitutional Separation of Powers   Between the President and Congress, 20 Op. O.L.C. 124,126-28, 133-35 (1996)   (explaining that, under Supreme Court case law, congressional action that   interferes with the functioning of the Executive Branch, including “attempts to   dictate the processes of executive deliberation,” can violate general separation   of powers principles); Nixon v. Administrator ofGeneral Services, 433 U.S.   425,443 (1977) (congressional enactment that “disrupts the proper balance   between the coordinate branches” may violate the separation of powers).
                Congressional oversight of the process by which the Executive Branch responds   to congressional oversight inquiries would create a detrimental dynamic that is   quite similar to what would occur in litigation if lawyers had to disclose to   adversaries their deliberations about the case, and specifically about how to   respond to their adversaries’ discovery requests. As the Supreme Court   recognized in establishing the attorney work product doctrine, “it is essential   that a lawyer work with a certain degree of privacy, free from unnecessary   intrusion by opposing parties and their counsel.” Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S.   495, 510-11 (1947). Were attorney work product “open to opposing counsel on mere   demand,” the Court explained, “[i]nefficiency, unfairness and sharp practices   would inevitably develop in the giving of legal advice and in the preparation of   cases for trial … , [a]nd the interests of the clients and the cause of justice   would be poorly served.” !d. at 511.
                Similarly, in the oversight context, as the Department recognized in the   prior administration, a congressional power to request information from the   Executive Branch and then review the ensuing Executive Branch discussions   regarding how to respond to that request would chill the candor of those   Executive Branch discussions and “introduce a significantly unfair imbalance to   the oversight process.” Letter for John Conyers, Jr., Chairman, Committee on the   Judiciary, U.S. House ofRepresentatives, and Linda T. Sanchez, Chairwoman,   Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law, Committee on the Judiciary,   U.S. House of Representatives, from Richard A. Bertling, Acting Assistant   Attorney General, Office of Legislative Affairs at 3 (Mar. 26, 2007). Such   congressional power would disserve both Branches and the oversight process   itself, which involves two co-equal branches of government and, like litigation,   often is, and needs to be, adversarial. We recognize that it is essential to   Congress’s ability to interact independently and effectively with the Executive   Branch that the confidentiality of internal deliberations among Members of   Congress and their staffs be
                  protected against incursions by the Executive   Branch. See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 616 (1972) (“The Speech or   Debate Clause was designed to assure a co-equal branch of the government wide   freedom of speech, debate, and deliberation without intimidation or threats from   the Executive Branch.”). It is likewise essential to the Executive Branch’s   ability to respond independently and effectively to matters under congressional   review that the confidentiality of internal Executive Branch deliberations be   protected against incursions by Congress.
                Moreover, there is an additional, particularized separation of powers concern   here because the Committee’s inquiry into Fast and Furious has sought   information about ongoing criminal investigations and prosecutions. Such   information would itself be protected by executive privilege, see, e.g.,   Assertion of Executive Privilege in Response to Congressional Demands for Law   Enforcement Files, 6 Op. O.L.C. 31,32 (1982) (opinion of Attorney General   William French Smith) (“[I]t has been the policy of the Executive Branch   throughout this Nation’s history generally to decline to provide committees of   Congress with access to or copies of law enforcement files except in the most   extraordinary circumstances.”). Consequently, the Department’s deliberations   about how to respond to these congressional inquiries involved discussion of how   to ensure that critical ongoing law enforcement actions are not compromised and   that law enforcement decisionmaking is not tainted by even the appearance of   political influence. See, e.g., id. at 33 (noting “substantial danger that   congressional pressures will influence the course ofthe investigation … [and]   potential damage to proper law enforcement which would be caused by the   revelation of sensitive techniques, methods, or strategy”) (quotation marks   omitted). Maintaining the confidentiality of such candid internal discussions   helps preserve the independence, integrity, and effectiveness of the   Department’s law enforcement efforts.
                III.
                A congressional committee “may overcome an assertion of executive privilege   only if it establishes that the subpoenaed documents are ‘demonstrably critical   to the responsible fulfillment of the Committee’s functions.”‘ Special Counsel   Assertion at 5-6 (quoting Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign   Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725,731 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en bane) (emphasis   added)); see also, e.g., US. Attorneys Assertion at 2 (same); Clemency   Assertion, 23 Op. O.L.C. at 2 (same); Nixon, 418 U.S. at 707 (“[I]t is necessary   to resolve those competing interests in a manner that preserves the essential   functions of each branch.”). “Those functions must be in furtherance of   Congress’s legitimate legislative responsibilities,” Special Counsel Assertion   at 5 (emphasis added), for “[c]ongressional oversight of Executive Branch   actions is justifiable only as a means of facilitating the legislative task of   enacting, amending, or repealing laws.” 1981 Assertion, 5 Op. O.L.C. at 30-31.   See also, e.g., Special Counsel Assertion at 5; US. Attorneys Assertion at 2-3;   McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 176 (1927) (congressional oversight power   may be used only to “obtain information in aid of the legislative function”);   Eastland v. US. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 504 n.15 (1975) (“The subject   of any [congressional] inquiry always must be one on which legislation could be   had.”) (quotation marks omitted).
                A.
                The Committee has not satisfied the “demonstrably critical” standard with   respect to the documents at issue. The Committee has said that it needs the   post-February 4 documents “related to the Department’s response to Congress”   concerning Fast and Furious in order to “examine the Department’s mismanagement   of its response to Operation Fast and Furious.” Chairman’s Letter at 1-2. More   specifically, the Committee has explained in the report that it is scheduled to   consider at its June 20 contempt meeting that it needs these documents so that   it can “understand what the Department knew about Fast and Furious, including   when and how it discovered its February 4 letter was false, and the Department’s   efforts to conceal that information from Congress and the public.” Comm. on   Oversight and Gov’t Reform, U.S. House ofRepresentatives, Report at 33 (June 15,   2012). House leaders have similarly communicated that the driving concern behind   the Committee’s scheduled contempt vote is to determine whether Department   leaders attempted to “mislead or misinform Congress” in response to   congressional inquiries into Fast and Furious. See Letter for Eric H. Holder,   Jr., Attorney General, from John A. Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of   Representatives, et al. at 1 (May 18, 2012) (“Speaker’s Letter”).
                At the threshold, it is not evident that the Committee’s asserted need to   review the management of the Department’s response to congressional inquiries   furthers a legislative function of Congress. See WHCO Documents Assertion, 20   Op. O.L.C. at 4 (noting the question of “the extent of Congress’s authority to   conduct oversight ofthe executive branch’s response to oversight … must be   viewed as unresolved as a matter oflaw in light of the requirement that there be   a nexus to Congress’s legislative authority”). In any event, the purported   connection between the congressional interest cited and the documents at issue   is now highly attenuated as a result ofthe Department’s extraordinary efforts to   accommodate the Committee’s interest in this regard. Through these efforts, the   Department has amply fulfilled its constitutional “obligation… to make a   principled effort to acknowledge, and if possible to meet, the [Committee's]   legitimate needs.” 1981 Assertion, 5 Op. O.L.C. at 31; see also, e.g. , United   States v. AT&T, 567 F.2d 121, 127, 130 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (“[E]ach branch   should take cognizance of an implicit constitutional mandate to seek optimal   accommodation through a realistic evaluation of the needs of the conflicting   branches in the particular fact situation…. Negotiation between the two branches   should thus be viewed as a dynamic process affirmatively furthering the   constitutional scheme.”).
                Specifically, the Department has already shared with the Committee over 1300   pages of documents concerning the drafting of the February 4 Letter, in   acknowledgment that the February 4 Letter contained inaccurate information. In   addition, numerous Department officials and employees, including the Attorney   General, have provided testimony and other statements concerning both the   conduct of Fast and Furious and the Department’s preparation and withdrawal of   the February 4 Letter. This substantial record shows that the inaccuracies in   the February 4 Letter were the inadvertent product of the fact that, at the time   they were preparing that letter, neither Department leaders nor the heads of   relevant Department components on whom Department leaders reasonably relied for   information knew the correct facts about the tactics used in Fast and Furious.   Department leaders first learned that flawed tactics may have been used in Fast   and Furious when public allegations about such tactics surfaced in early 2011,   after such tactics had been discontinued. But Department leaders were mistakenly   assured by the heads of relevant Department components that those allegations   were false. As the Department collected and reviewed documents to provide to the   Committee during the months after submitting the February 4 Letter, however,   Department leaders came to understand that Fast and Furious was in fact   fundamentally flawed and that the February 4 Letter may have been inaccurate.   While the Department was developing that understanding, Department officials   made public statements and took other actions alerting the Committee to their   increasing concern about the tactics actually used in Fast and Furious and the   accuracy of the February 4 Letter. When the Department was confident that it had   a sufficient understanding of the factual record, it formally withdrew the   February 4 Letter. All of this demonstrates that the Department did not in any   way intend to mislead the Committee.
                The Department continued its extraordinary efforts at accommodating the   Committee by recently offering to provide the Committee with a briefing, based   on documents that the Committee could retain, explaining further how the   Department’s understanding of the facts of Fast and Furious evolved during the   post-February 4 period, as well as the process that led to the withdrawal of the   February 4 Letter. The Department believes that this briefing, and the   accompanying documents, would have fully addressed what the Committee described   as its remaining concerns related to the February 4 Letter and the good faith of   the Department in responding to the Committee’s investigation. The Committee,   however, has not accepted this offer of accommodation.
                Finally, the Committee’s asserted need for post-February 4 documents is   further diminished by the Inspector General’s ongoing investigation of Fast and   Furious, which was undertaken at my request. As an Executive Branch official,   the Inspector General may obtain access to documents that are privileged from   disclosure to Congress. The existence of this investigation belies any suspicion   that the Department is attempting to conceal important facts concerning Fast and   Furious from the Committee. Moreover, in light of the Inspector General’s   investigation, congressional oversight is not the only means by which the   management of the Department’s response to Fast and Furious may be   scrutinized.
                In brief, the Committee received all documents that involved the Department’s   preparation of the February 4 Letter. The Committee’s legitimate interest in   obtaining documents created after the February 4 Letter is highly attenuated and   has been fully accommodated by the Department. The Committee lacks any   “demonstrably critical” need for further access to the Department’s   deliberations to address concerns arising out of the February 4 Letter.
                B.
                The Department’s accommodations have concerned only a subset of the topics   addressed in the withheld post-February 4 documents. The documents and   information provided or offered to the Committee address primarily the evolution   of the Department’s understanding of the facts of Fast and Furious and the   process that led to the withdrawal ofthe February 4 Letter. Most of the withheld   post-February 4 documents, however, relate to other aspects of the Department’s   response to congressional and related media inquiries, such as procedures or   strategies for responding to the Committee’s requests for documents and other   information. The Committee has not articulated any particularized interest in or   need for documents relating to such topics, let alone a need that would further   a legislative function.
                “Broad, generalized assertions that the requested materials are of public   import are simply insufficient under the ‘demonstrably critical’ standard.” US.   Attorneys Assertion at 3; see also, e.g., Congressional Requests Opinion, 13 Op.   O.L.C. at 160 (“‘A specific, articulated need for information will weigh   substantially more heavily in the constitutional balancing than a generalized   interest in obtaining information.”‘) (quoting 1981 Assertion, 5 Op. O.L.C. at   30)). Moreover, “Congress’s legislative function does not imply a freestanding   authority to gather information for the sole purpose of informing ‘the American   people.’” Special Counsel Assertion at 6. The “only informing function”   constitutionally vested in Congress “‘is that of informing itself about subjects   susceptible to legislation, not that of informing the public.”‘ !d. (quoting   Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 709 F.2d 524, 531 (9th Cir. 1983)). In the   absence of any particularized legitimate need, the Committee’s interest in   obtaining additional post¬ February 4 documents cannot overcome the substantial   and important separation of powers and Executive Branch confidentiality concerns   raised by its demand.
                * * * *
                In sum, when I balance the Committee’s asserted need for the documents at   issue against the Executive Branch’s strong interest in protecting the   confidentiality of internal documents generated in the course of responding to   congressional and related media inquiries and the separation of powers concerns   raised by a congressional demand for such material, I conclude that the   Committee has not established that the privileged documents are demonstrably   critical to the responsible fulfillment of the Committee’s legitimate   legislative functions.
                IV.
                For the reasons set forth above, I have concluded that you may properly   assert executive privilege over the documents at issue, and I respectfully   request that you do so.
                Sincerely,
                Eric H. Holder, Jr. Attorney General